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ABSTRACT 
For over a decade, homeland security leaders have urged emergency response agencies to 
improve their collaborative capacity. Collaboration and coordination is critical to 
homeland security effectiveness. The homeland security threat scenarios facing NYC, 
including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and high consequence accidents, require a 
synergistic response from first arriving responders.  
To understand the foundation of collaborative relationships among the FDNY and 
NYPD, this thesis examines the concept of “swift trust.” Swift trust is a unique form of 
trust that occurs between groups or individuals brought together in temporary teams to 
accomplish specific tasks, often under time constraints. This thesis examines swift trust 
formation in military, business, and virtual collaborative studies. It applies the factors 
critical to swift trust formation in those areas to interagency incidents involving the 
NYPD and FDNY. Among the factors affecting the formation of swift trust between 
NYC first responders are initial interactions and communications, identification of roles 
and assigned tasks, formulation of a team identity, and organizational culture.  
The conclusions drawn from this research reveal organizational and procedural 
barriers preventing the formation of swift trust at interagency incidents. Additionally, 
current training is largely ineffective at developing swift trust.  
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Thousands of times each day, New York City (NYC) firefighters and police 
officers respond to standard calls, such as structural fires, medical emergencies, and 
criminal investigations that do not involve or require collaboration with emergency 
responders from other agencies. However, large-scale events, whether terrorism related, 
or man-made or natural disasters, require such collaboration. These incidents are complex 
endeavors that require the building of a synergistic response network.1 To achieve that 
synergy, individual agency-specific missions must be accomplished simultaneously, 
collaboratively, and with an understanding of other agencies’ missions.2  
For over a decade, homeland security leaders have urged emergency response 
agencies to improve their collaborative capacity. By mandating that federal, and later 
state and local agencies use the National Incident Management System (NIMS) in 
managing domestic incidents, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5 called 
upon all levels of government to establish the capacity to work “efficiently and 
effectively together.”3 Furthermore, in addressing national preparedness, HSPD 8 granted 
federal assistance for state and local agencies to build capacity for collaboration in 
response to major events, including terrorism.4 Events like the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane 
Katrina demonstrate that no single agency has the capacity to address all aspects of these 
major incidents. This thesis builds upon prior research that found interagency and 
interpersonal trust to be a critical factor in fostering collaboration between individuals, 
                                                 
1 Joseph W. Pfeifer, “Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced First Responders at the 
World Trade Center,” in Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar et al. (Oxford University Press, 2007), 
214.  
2 Joseph Duggan Jr., “The New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team (NY-TF1): A Case Study 
of Interagency Effectiveness” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 30, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=5545. 
3 United States Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, 
Management of Domestic Incidents, February 28, 2003, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5html. 
(author’s italics) 
4 United States Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, 
National Preparedness, December 17, 2003, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html.  
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groups, and organizations.5 Continued research is needed to understand various factors 
influencing inter-organizational collaboration. Specifically, this thesis examines the 
factors affecting the formation of “swift trust,” a trust that forms between individuals or 
groups without a prior relationship, and the barriers preventing members of the New 
York City Fire Department (FDNY) and New York City Police Department (NYPD) 
from developing swift trust, thus inhibiting collaboration. 
A. PROBLEM SPACE 
The need for collaboration and coordination is generally assumed at large-scale 
interagency incidents. It has been argued that the failure to coordinate, exhibited by a lack 
of information sharing, resulted in emergency responder deaths at the World Trade 
Center on 9/11.6 Responses to terror attacks and major natural disasters, like Hurricane 
Katrina and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, exemplify this need, and for 10 years, 
government commissions, consultants, and homeland security directives have called for 
better collaboration and coordination among emergency response agencies.7 The thinking 
is that a lack of coordinated response leads to a duplication of effort among first 
responders; the lack of collaboration results in a less effective response, and ultimately, a 
less effective response means greater loss of life and property and longer recovery time 
following an incident.  
Decades of study into the importance of collaboration and coordination during 
emergency operations management resulted in numerous initiatives. In the 1970s, 
massive wildfires in the western United States requiring the collaboration of numerous 
agencies led to the development of systems and training, and eventually, the Incident 
                                                 
5 Aneil K. Mishra, “Organizing Responses to Crisis: The Centrality of Trust,” in Trust in 
Organizations, ed. Roderick M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1996), 276. 
6 J. Randall Lawson and Robert L. Vettori, “NCSTAR 1–8, Federal Building and Fire Safety 
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster, The Emergency Response Operations,” National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, September 2005, 174, 
http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=101049.  
7 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 321, 397; Fire Department of the City of New York, 
“McKinsey Report: Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness,” 61–62, August 19, 2002, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/mck_report/toc.html; Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. 
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Command System (ICS) and NIMS. In 2003, HSPD 5 mandated NIMS, calling for a 
“comprehensive national incident management system” to manage the “prevention, 
preparation, response, and recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies.”8 In 2004, New York City adopted similar protocols for managing 
emergency responses called the Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS).9 
However, CIMS has not brought about the necessary operational collaboration among the 
emergency response agencies.  
These written policies, while necessary as practical guidelines and required for 
federal funding,10 have not proven an effective strategy for addressing the underlying 
problems inhibiting greater collaboration. In fact, in some ways, CIMS exacerbates 
collaboration problems by perpetuating redundant capabilities and encouraging 
interagency competition through “first to arrive” protocols between the FDNY and 
NYPD.11 Furthermore, collaboration difficulties extend beyond major incidents to more 
common ones that fall within the tactical capabilities of both agencies. For instance, 
currently, the NYPD and FDNY both conduct search and rescue operations at incidents, 
such as structural collapses, train or automobile accidents, and water rescues. It is not 
uncommon to have police and fire units operating separately without integrating their 
search plan or establishing a unified command early in an incident.12 The vast majority of 
interagency incidents are resolved successfully, whether collaboratively or not, without 
noticeable disagreement. However, in some cases, these incidents grow into public 
interagency disputes. Recently, members of the FDNY and NYPD failed to collaborate 
during the successful rescue of three workers hanging from a scaffold 17 stories above 
                                                 
8 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. 
9 New York City Office of Emergency Management, Citywide Incident Management System, April 6, 
2005, (n.d.), http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/about/about_cims.shtml. NYC began operating under 
CIMS protocols on May 14, 2004. 
10 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. 
11 New York City Office of Emergency Management, CIMS: Primary Agency Matrix, Annex A, April 
6, 2005, 4, (n.d.), http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/about/cims_matrix.shtml. 
12 Thomas J. Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management: Fostering Trust to Enhance 
Collaboration in Complex Adaptive Emergency Response Systems” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2009), 1, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=30814. 
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the ground.13 Incidents like these, publicized in the press as the “battle of the badges,” 
continue to embarrass NYC’s highly respected police and fire departments. Despite 
incremental improvements in the collaborative capacity of the FDNY and NYPD, 
difficulty in collaborating still exists at the initial responder level. Something is missing.  
B. SWIFT TRUST AND TEMPORARY GROUPS 
Historically, researchers viewed trust as a “dynamic phenomenon,” that develops 
and strengthens over time.14 However, research has identified a large degree of trust 
among individuals and groups early in relationships.15 The research found that temporary 
groups display behavior that presupposes trust without any history of trust development 
among the group.16 Swift trust is a unique form of trust that occurs between groups or 
individuals brought together in temporary teams to accomplish specific tasks, often under 
time constraints.17 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer coined the term “swift trust” in 1996 as 
a concept for understanding how temporary systems functioned.18 In their research, they 
observed that despite the lack of traditional sources of trust, such as familiarity and 
shared experiences, temporary groups can work on tasks that require great complexity, 
often involving high risk outcomes. Interagency responses involving the FDNY and 
NYPD in NYC exhibit some of the qualities of temporary groups. The literature on swift 
trust offers some hope in understanding the factors necessary for trusting, collaborative 
interagency responses from the moment agencies arrive at an incident.  
                                                 
13 Al Baker, “17 Floors Up, Rescue of 3 Shows Clash of Agencies,” New York Times, A17, April 14, 
2012, http://nytimes.com/2012/04/14/nyregion/skyscraper-rescue-shows-clash-of-ny-police-and-fire-
depts.html?_r=2. 
14 Roy J. Lewicki and Barbara Benedict Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work 
Relationships,” in Trust in Organizations, ed. Roderick R. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler (Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage, 1996), 118. 
15 D. Harrison McKnight, Larry L. Cummings, and Norman L. Chervany, “Initial Trust Formation in 
New Organizational Relationships,” Academy of Management Review 23, no. 3 (July 1998). 
16 R. A. Goodman and L. P. Goodman, “Some Management Issues In Temporary Systems: A Study of 
Professional Development and Manpower—The Theater Case,” Administrative Science Quarterly 21, no. 3 
(September 1976): 494. 
17 Roxanne Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” presented at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Cebrowski Institute, September 7, 2006. 
18 Debra Meyerson, Karl E. Weick, and Roderick R. Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” in 
Trust in Organizations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 1996), 168–95. 
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C. BACKGROUND 
Despite the Presidential Directives and federal mandates, and the criticism of the 
response to the World Trade Center and recommendations to improve collaboration and 
coordination in works like the 9/11 Commission Report and the McKinsey Report,19 NYC 
emergency response agencies continue to face difficulty collaborating, particularly in the 
early stages of an incident. However, progress has been made in collaboration and 
coordination among NYC’s emergency response agencies in the area of pre-incident 
planning. The FDNY greatly increased the number of tabletop exercises involving 
multiple agencies and interagency drills over the past decade.20 Additionally, Incident 
Action Plans are written and interagency meetings are conducted for most major planned 
events in NYC. Furthermore, some improvement at extended operations has occurred in 
which higher levels of command from various agencies arrive at an incident scene. These 
efforts, while important and commendable, do not adequately address more systemic 
problems preventing collaboration and coordination early in interagency incidents.  
1. Incremental Improvements 
The lack of a comprehensive collaborative incident management system in NYC 
is not due to a lack of effort. Since 9/11, FDNY leadership has demonstrated its 
willingness and desire to collaborate with other agencies in various ways.21 One of the 
objectives highlighted in its most recent Strategic Plan is to “expand terrorism and 
disaster preparedness training through intra- and inter-agency exercises to further 
enhance the Department’s all-hazard response protocols.”22 Interagency drills, tabletop 
exercises, and full-scale exercises continue to be the primary way in which the FDNY 
                                                 
19 The 9/11 Commission Report, 319; Fire Department of the City of New York, “McKinsey Report: 
Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness,” 62. 
20 Joseph W. Pfeifer, “Revisiting the Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness,” With New York 
Firefighters: WNYF, no. 3 (2011): 11. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Fire Department of the City of New York, “FDNY Strategic Plan 2011–2013,” 11, (n.d.), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/publications/FDNY_strategic_plan_2011_2013.pdf. 
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prepares its members to work collaboratively with other agencies.23 However, this 
strategy, while effective at understanding some tactics of other agencies under specific, 
pre-planned scenarios, is not a comprehensive strategy for improving collaboration. In 
fact, one fire chief noted, “these drill scenarios become more of a competition between 
agencies determined to display their own capabilities, rather than an agency deploying its 
individual resources in support of the joint achievement of incident objectives and 
strategies.”24 
2. Information Sharing  
In terms of information sharing in furtherance of collaboration, the FDNY 
continues to make technology improvements in the areas of communications and incident 
command within the department. Radios with greater wattage improved the 
communications between firefighters and commanders at an incident scene. Also, 
firefighters can now communicate with FDNY EMS personnel at an incident. 
Additionally, the FDNY built an information-sharing framework that connects members 
at an incident to commanders in the Fire Department Operations Center (FDOC).25 This 
link did not exist on 9/11 and greatly improves the flow of information within the 
department, particularly when the FDOC is being used as a base of operations when 
multiple incidents occur simultaneously in various parts of the city. FDNY radios also 
have a frequency on which to communicate with NYPD radios and FDNY chiefs are 
given an interoperable radio to be used if an incident dictates. However, these are rarely, 
if ever, used in the initial stages of an incident. Just as interagency drills do not 
necessarily ensure collaboration, interoperable radios alone do not either. These 
improvements have been incremental or sustaining and are designed to address specific 
problems existing on 9/11 and in the years since, such as technological barriers 
                                                 
23 Fire Department of the City of New York, “FDNY Strategic Plan 2011–2013,” 12. 
24 Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management,” 1. 
25 Fire Department of the City of New York, “FDNY Counterterrorism and Risk Management 
Strategy,” 20, December 2011, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/publications/FDNY_ct_strategy_2011_12.pdf. 
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preventing effective interagency communications.26 However, they do little to address 
other barriers to collaboration, the problem behind the problem.27 A better radio or 
interagency drills alone do not solve these problems. 
3. Systemic Problem 
The emerging problem is that, despite the agencies’ recognition of the need for 
collaboration, difficulty persists at the initial responder level in the early stages of 
interagency incidents. This problem has not been solved by CIMS, the pre-incident 
planning and tabletop exercises and drills, or by the Mayor’s Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM), the NYC agency charged with creating and overseeing a 
collaborative emergency response. It has also become clear that the problem is not the 
lack of technology or the failure to achieve full interoperability. While the vast majority 
of incidents are resolved without agency disputes, the lack of public conflicts does not 
signal achievement of interagency synergy. Rather, in the complex system that is 
emergency response, challenges to collaboration are “largely social, institutional, 
cultural, and organizational.”28 This research inquires into the positive effect of swift 
trust on overcoming those challenges.  
4. Complex Systems 
Understanding the collaborative capacity of organizations has become 
increasingly important in an interdependent organizational environment. Homeland 
security response and other multi-agency responses are complex systems. Complex 
systems are those with numerous agents or elements interacting with each other and their 
environment. In complex systems, understanding one element or building block of the 
                                                 
26 Pfeifer, “Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced First Responders at the World Trade 
Center,” 208. 
27 Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative 
Rationality for Public Policy (Routledge, 2010), 4. Kindle edition, 456 of 7633. 
28 Larry Wentz, “An ICT Primer Information and Communication Technologies for Civil-Military 
Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction,” Center for Technology and National 
Security Policy, National Defense University, 2, July 2006, 
http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP31%20ICT%20Primer.pdf.  
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system does not lead to an understanding of the overall system. The complexity of the 
system “is determined by the number and diversity of interacting components.”29 
Complex systems are also nonlinear. In other words, the system’s future behavior cannot 
be accurately predicted by the behavior of an individual part of the system.30 Responses 
to homeland security incidents exhibit the characteristics of complex systems. 
These incidents require the response of multiple organizations to achieve 
organizational goals that no single organization could achieve independently.31 Unlike 
the traditional hierarchical relationships existing within many of the agencies charged 
with homeland security and emergency response, in these systems, relationships are not 
defined in a hierarchical intra-agency manner but rather across agency divides. Operating 
in this complex system has, on occasion, proven difficult for strong, traditionally 
hierarchical organizations like the FDNY and NYPD.  
As difficult as it has proved to address the problems of past incidents, it should be 
noted that terrorist networks adapt and innovate rapidly to exploit gaps in security and 
response. Events like the Mumbai attacks in 2008, which involved multiple targets and 
multiple attack methods including active shooters, explosives, and fires, demonstrate the 
capabilities of terrorists determined to adapt their tactics in an effort to maximize an 
attack. While it is essential to attempt to fill in the gaps exposed in past incidents, 
responder agencies must also demonstrate the capability to innovate within this complex 
adaptive system to prepare for future incidents. The increased frequency of natural 
disasters and their cascading effects exhibited in events like Hurricane Katrina and the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster show that non-terrorist events also require an innovative 
interagency response.  
In incidents like these, first responders become victims of the disaster and 
departments become unable to respond adequately. In these situations, the close 
                                                 
29 James Jay Carafano, “Complex Systems Analysis—A Necessary Tool for Homeland Security,” 
Backgrounder: The Heritage Foundation, no. 2261, April 16, 2009, 2. 
30 Philip Anderson, “Complexity Theory and Organization Science,” Organization Science 10, no. 3, 
(May–June 1999): 217. 
31 Tammy E. Beck, Ph.D., “Understanding Swift Trust in Temporary Interorganizational 
Relationships” (PhD diss., The University of Texas at San Antonio, 2006), 5. 
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relationships and collaborative partnerships that may have been built by the local 
agencies are destroyed by the incident itself. Other responders that come to help must 
find ways to form new collaborative relationships fast. Most importantly, the complex 
adaptive system requires that such innovation be done with an understanding of the 
potential impact on the whole system. Thus, agencies involved in homeland security 
response must demonstrate a “willingness to innovate organizationally and doctrinally 
and by building new mechanisms for interagency and multijurisdictional cooperation.”32 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Primary Question 
What factors influence the formation of swift trust and how can NYC police 
officers and firefighters utilize what is known about swift trust to improve interagency 
collaboration during the initial stages of an incident? 
2. Secondary Question 
Given what is known about swift trust, what effect does the current incident 
management system, the FDNY and NYPD response policies, and the FDNY’s efforts to 
improve collaboration have on the creation of swift trust and on collaboration and 
coordination during the initial stages of an incident? 
E. PRIOR RESEARCH 
This thesis builds upon the research of several FDNY colleagues. Chief Thomas 
Currao examined the effect of trust on fostering interagency collaboration. He found that 
trust acts as a catalyst for interagency collaboration that enhances information sharing 
and problem solving between agencies.33 In his work, he briefly mentioned swift trust as 
another form of trust with possible implications for emergency management. Other 
                                                 
32 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy (Rand, 2001), 54, 
http://faculty.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/afgjp/padm610/networks%20and%20netwar.pdf. 
33 Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management.” 
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colleagues have written theses on collaboration and coordination between the FDNY and 
NYPD. Chief Joseph Duggan examined NYC’s Urban Search and Rescue Team (NY-
TF1), which deploys to large incidents outside of NYC and consists of both FDNY and 
NYPD personnel. He used the NY-TF1 as a case study for improving interagency 
collaboration between the FDNY and NYPD in NYC.34 Additionally, Captain Sean 
Newman explored the possibility of combining FDNY and NYPD members into joint 
“swarm units” to address potential Mumbai style attacks involving active shooters and 
the use of fire as a weapon.35 Finally, Chief John Esposito and Captain Joseph McGeary 
examined the shortcomings of CIMS and its potential barriers to collaboration.36 This 
research adds to the knowledge of interagency collaboration by examining the concept of 
swift trust and its effect on collaboration among temporary groups.  
Swift trust research developed out of research into trust and its influence on 
organizations. In particular, it grew out of the study of the effectiveness of temporary 
groups. Researchers first examined the effects of swift trust in the business environment. 
Businesses and groups partner, merge, and form smaller temporary working groups. 
Increasingly, workers find themselves collaborating with others in different parts of the 
country or world. Swift trust allows individuals to collaborate with people with whom 
they have no prior personal relationship. There has been a particular focus on virtual 
groups due to the growth of telecommuting and globalization. Additional areas of swift 
trust research include the study of military organizations and Nongovernmental 
Organizations (NGOs). Like other organizations, military groups increasingly collaborate 
with others from different disciplines, or branches of the service.  
Finally, this research draws upon and advances the research into organizations 
and groups. The study of how individuals collaborate within organizations and between 
                                                 
34 Duggan, “The New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team.” 
35 Sean S. Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police 
Units Facing Paramilitary Terrorism” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=5482. 
36 John M. Esposito, “New York City Fire Department Chief Officer’s Evaluation of the Citywide 
Incident Management System as it Pertains to Interagency Emergency Response” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691272; Joseph P. McGeary, “Applying 
Goldwater-Nichols Reforms to Foster Interagency Cooperation Between Public Safety Agencies in New 
York City” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=471886.  
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organizations is beneficial to diagnosing potential problems achieving interagency 
collaboration. Additionally, swift trust is an area of study with a particular importance to 
understanding temporary groups. As this thesis demonstrates, firefighters and police 
officers collaborating at an incident can be viewed as a temporary group, each with 
individual missions in support of one mission. By understanding the foundations to swift 
trust in other contexts, the author intends to draw comparisons to the situation existing 
among emergency responders in NYC. A more thorough review of the literature in these 
areas follows in Section II.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
The primary methodology for this research is a review of the existing literature on 
swift trust and a secondary analysis of previously tested swift trust studies. The author 
examines studies into swift trust performed in the business, military, and virtual 
collaboration environments. From that analysis, the author exacts common themes 
relevant or necessary to the formation or prevention of swift trust. He then applies those 
common themes to emergency response procedures and policies in NYC to determine the 
effectiveness of swift trust development among FDNY and NYPD members. Next, he 
examines the training and procedures used by the FDNY to enhance its collaborative 
capacity to determine their effect on swift trust. The goal is to identify structures or 
requirements that could be enacted to form swift trust and improve collaboration.  
G. ARGUMENT 
Collaboration among agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions is “critical” to 
homeland security effectiveness.37 The homeland security threat scenarios facing NYC, 
including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and high consequence accidents, require a 
“task force mindset”38 among the first arriving responders. It is the critical decisions 
                                                 
37 Susan Hocevar, Erik Jansen, and Gail Fann Thomas, “Building Collaborative Capacity for 
Homeland Security,” prepared for the Office of Domestic Preparedness, I, November 1, 2004, 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456228. 
38 Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management,” 2; Duggan, “The New York City Urban Search 
and Rescue Team (NY-TF1), 42. 
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made at the early stages of an incident that can have the greatest positive or negative 
impact on the overall emergency response. To understand the foundation of collaborative 
relationships among NYC first responders from different agencies, this thesis examines 
the concept of “swift trust.”39 
Numerous studies have examined trust and its role in fostering collaboration.40 
Trust can take a variety of forms, including institutional trust, organizational trust, and 
trust in leadership. However, swift trust is a unique form of trust that occurs between 
groups or individuals brought together in temporary teams to accomplish specific tasks, 
often under time constraints.41 Individuals tasked to work together require an initial level 
of trust.42 Swift trust deals with issues of uncertainty, vulnerability, risk, and 
expectations.43 The research found various factors that can enhance or prevent the 
formation of swift trust, and thus, affect collaboration. 
Interagency emergency incidents bring together responders from various agencies 
to accomplish complex tasks, often under severe time constraints. These types of 
responses require interagency coordination and collaboration. Collaboration is the act of 
joining together with another for a purpose. Coordination is harmonizing actions in 
furtherance of a purpose. In these scenarios, emergency responders representing separate 
organizations exhibit the characteristics of temporary groups working towards individual 
goals in support of an overall mission. These inter-organizational groups exhibit 
characteristics in which swift trust may be a useful concept. By examining the 
mechanisms through which swift trust forms, NYC first responders and their agencies 
can take specific actions to develop and enhance swift trust and improve collaboration at 
the first responder level. Additionally, swift trust provides a flexible framework through 
                                                 
39 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 166. 
40 Ibid.; Kurt T. Dirks and Donald L. Ferrin, “The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings,” 
Organizational Science 12, no. 4 (July–August 2001), 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/openurl?volume=12&date=2001&spage=450&issn=10477039&issu
e=4; Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks.” 
41 Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 4. 
42 Clara Popa, “Initial Trust Formation in Temporary Small Task Groups: Testing a Model of Swift 
Trust” (Ph.D. diss., Kent State University, May 2005), 2. 
43 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 167. 
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which disparate groups can work together. Among the improvements needed to form 
swift trust between the FDNY and NYPD are better and more frequent initial interactions 
and communication among the responders, identifying clear roles and assigning tasks 
early in an incident, formulating a team approach to interagency incidents, and 
transforming the organizational cultures from ones suspicious of others to ones willing to 
work across agency boundaries. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It has become increasingly clear that emergency response in the 21st century 
requires collaboration. The need for collaboration is generally assumed at large-scale 
interagency incidents because it “enhances the probability of mission completion by 
leveraging dispersed resources.”44 Collaboration benefits organizations by reducing 
costs, improving relationships, streamlining delivery of services, and improving 
information sharing. To improve the collaborative capacity of emergency response 
agencies, it is essential to examine the factors that influence collaboration. Numerous 
researchers argue that trust is a factor that benefits collaboration.45 However, traditional 
forms of trust often take time to build, which is often not possible in the initial phases of 
emergency responses. Due to the unique nature of emergency response, this review 
examines the literature on swift trust and its influence on collaboration. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Trust has many definitions and has been described as a reliance or confidence in 
the integrity or ability of a person or thing.46 Distrust is defined as suspicion of one’s 
integrity, agenda, or capabilities. Trust places the trustor in a vulnerable state based on 
the belief that the person or group being trusted is competent, open, concerned, and 
reliable.47 Another definition focuses not on the vulnerability of the trustor, but the 
reliability of the trustee. It states that trust “is a judgment or a confidence estimate that an 
                                                 
44 Gail Fann Thomas, Susan Page Hocevar, and Erik Jansen, “A Diagnostic Approach to Building 
Collaborative Capacity in an Interagency Context,” Naval Postgraduate School, 2, September 25, 2006, 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=469721. 
45 Dirks and Ferrin, “The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings”; Mishra, “Organizational 
Responses to Crisis”; Bill McEvily, Vincenzo Perrone, and Akbar Zaheer, “Trust as an Organizing 
Principle,” Organization Science 14, no. 1 (January–February 2003). 
46 Stephen M. R. Covey, The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything (New York: 
Free Press, 2006), 5; Piotr Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5. 
47 Mishra, “Organizational Responses to Crisis,” 265; Denise M. Rousseau et al., “Not So Different 
After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust,” Academy of Management Review 23, no. 3 (July 1998): 395.  
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organization or a person is going to act in a predictable way.”48 Issues of trust affect 
everyone’s personal and professional lives. Trust has been studied from perspectives of 
anthropology, sociology, social psychology, economics, and political science.49 In 
addition to the varying fields that study trust, there are varying types of trust to be 
studied. Some of these subgroups applicable to collaboration include institutional trust, 
interpersonal trust, and inter-organizational trust. 
Institutional trust is “trust that develops when individuals must generalize their 
personal trust to large organizations made up of individuals with whom they have low 
familiarity, low interdependence, and low continuity of interaction.”50 Interpersonal trust 
has been described as a mediator between people.51 It is trust between individuals, which 
is usually developed over time from numerous past interactions.52 Inter-organizational 
trust is often an outgrowth of interpersonal trust in which individuals with interpersonal 
trust represent different organizations and transfer the trust they developed between 
themselves to the others’ organization. 
C. TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 
A significant amount of research into trust and its effects on organizations has 
been conducted. Scholars agree that trust benefits organizations. Some have observed that 
trust results in positive direct benefits, such as better attitudes and improved performance 
                                                 
48 Eugene J. Webb, “Trust and Crisis,” in Trust in Organizations, ed. Roderick M. Kramer and Tom R. 
Tyler (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 1996), 290. 
49Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory, ix; Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining 
Trust in Work Relationships,” 115.  
50 Abdo Nahmod, “The Collaborative Capacity of the NYPD, FDNY, and EMS in New York City: A 
Focus on the First Line Officer” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 1, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=27182, quoting Roy J. Lewicki and Barbara Benedict Bunker, “Trust in 
Relationships: A Model of Development and Decline,” in Conflict, Cooperation, and Justice, ed. Barbara 
B. Bunker and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1995). 
51 Ban Al-Ani and David Redmiles, “Trust in Distributed Teams: Support Through Continuous 
Coordination,” IEEE Software 26, no. 6 (November–December 2009). 
52 Thomas Foulquier and Claude Caron, “Towards a Formalization of Interorganizational Trust 
Networks for Crisis Management,” Presented at the 7th International ISCRAM Conference, May 2010, 
http://www.iscram.org/ISCRAM2010/Papers/106-Foulquier_etal.pdf.  
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among employees.53 Others argue that trust creates conditions under which positive 
outcomes, like collaboration among groups, can occur.54 McEvily et al. found trust to 
generate efficiencies by “conserving cognitive resources, lowering transaction costs, and 
simplifying decision making.”55 Dirks found that trust was a mediating variable between 
motivation and group performance.56 Trust was also found to be an important element of 
team building.57 It also enables individuals and organizations to address conflicts more 
efficiently and with less tension.58  
Trust provides a variety of benefits to inter-organizational relationships as well. 
Important to this research, trust has been shown to influence an organization’s intention 
to collaborate.59 Trust also lessens the time and effort needed to cooperate.60 Further 
research on trust suggests it has a positive influence on learning between collaborative 
partners.61 In terms of direct effects on collaboration, and of particular importance to 
emergency responders, trust is important in facilitating communication and information 
sharing between groups and individuals.  
                                                 
53 Roderick M. Kramer, “Trust and Distrust in Organizations,” Annual Review of Psychology 50 
(February 1999). 
54 Dirks and Ferrin, “The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings,” 455. 
55 McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer, “Trust as an Organizing Principle,” 99. 
56 Kurt T. Dirks, “The Effects of Interpersonal Trust on Work Group Performance,” Journal of 
Applied Psychology 84, no. 3 (June 1999). 
57 Popa, “Initial Trust Formation in Temporary Small Task Groups,” 4. 
58 Akbar Zaheer, Bill McEvily, and Vincenzo Perrone, “Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of 




59 Jakki Mohr and Robert Spekman, “Characteristics of Partnership Success: Partnership Attributes, 
Communication Behavior, and Conflict Resolution Techniques,” Strategic Management Journal 15, no. 2 
(February 1994); Beck, “Understanding Swift Trust in Temporary Interorganizational Relationships,” 10. 
60 Beck, “Understanding Swift Trust in Temporary Interorganizational Relationships,” 10. 
61 Daniel Z. Levin and Rob Cross, “The Strength of Weak Ties You Can Trust: The Mediating Role of 
Trust in Effective Knowledge Transfer,” Management Science 50, no. 11 (November 2004); Mark 
Dodgson, “Learning, Trust, and Technological Collaboration,” Human Relations 46, no. 1 (January 1993): 
91, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/30047959?seq=4. 
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D. SWIFT TRUST IN TEMPORARY GROUPS 
Another area of scholarship focuses on trust and its effects on temporary groups. 
Business and government organizations combine individuals with differing skill sets and 
backgrounds to solve problems. In these temporary systems, tasks and personnel are 
usually less well known than in more stable systems.62 They also involve people with 
little or no history of working together.63 These temporary groups bring to light social 
factors that foster or hinder collaboration.64 Although trust has been studied extensively, 
the concept of swift trust is still relatively new. Swift trust appears to have applicability to 
emergency responders facing interagency incidents requiring collaboration.  
The traditional understanding of trust views it as something that takes time to 
develop and strengthen.65 However, research into temporary groups and systems 
identified a large degree of trust early in relationships.66 Goodman and Goodman first 
studied temporary group behavior and found it to presuppose trust despite no existent 
history of trust development.67 This phenomenon was later expanded upon and identified 
as swift trust, which occurs between temporary groups or individuals brought together in 
temporary teams to accomplish specific goals.68 Meyerson et al. built upon the research 
into temporary groups by identifying social constraints and resources in temporary 
systems that allow trust to form.69 In these cases, temporary group behaviors presuppose 
trust and “act as if trust were present, but their histories seem to preclude its 
development.”70  
                                                 
62 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 158. 
63 Goodman and Goodman, “Some Management Issues in Temporary Systems,” 495. 
64 Popa, “Initial Trust Formation in Temporary Small Task Groups,” 3. 
65 Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships,” 118. 
66 McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany, “Initial Trust Formation in New Organizational 
Relationships,” 480. 
67 Goodman and Goodman, “Some Management Issues in Temporary Systems,” 494. 
68 Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 4. 
69 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 168. 
70 Ibid., 167. 
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The authors identified the following characteristics of temporary groups or 
systems with the potential for swift trust development. 
 “Participants with diverse skills are assembled by a contractor to enact 
expertise they already possess. 
 Participants have limited history working together. 
 Participants have limited prospects of working together again in the future. 
 Participants often are part of limited labor pools and overlapping 
networks. 
 Tasks are often complex and involve interdependent work. 
 Tasks have a deadline. 
 Assigned tasks are non-routine and not well understood. 
 Assigned tasks are consequential. 
 Continuous interrelating is required to produce an outcome.”71  
Meyerson et al. argue that by managing issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, risk, and 
expectations, swift trust develops. The concept of swift trust takes trust out of the 
personal form and focuses it on actions or tasks. Swift trust becomes a strategy for groups 
or individuals to manage vulnerability based on their roles rather than interpersonal 
relationships that have not had time to form. The authors put forth several propositions to 
increase the likelihood of swift trust among temporary groups. They argue that swift trust 
is more likely to develop when individuals working together are drawn from smaller 
labor pools, interact based upon their roles within the group, and understand and work 
within their roles.72 
1. Team Identity and Trust 
Dr. Roxanne Zolin studied swift trust and the difficulty in communication and 
collaboration among U.S. military forces, multinational forces, and NGOs engaged in 
stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTR). Her research 
revealed that national, organizational, and cultural differences were not the only 
                                                 
71 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 169. 
72 Ibid., 181. 
 20
impediment to effective collaboration.73 She argued that an “initial condition for swift 
trust is that participants perceive that they belong to the temporary team.”74 Zolin 
concluded that if members of the temporary team were drawn from organizations or labor 
pools too large, swift trust formation would be unlikely.75 She argued that in such cases, 
group members would not perceive themselves as part of a team, know each other, have 
the same colleagues, or anticipate working together in the future.  
In this point, Zolin differs somewhat from Meyerson et al. who argued that 
members of temporary groups need not have worked together in the past or have the 
possibility of working together in the future to develop swift trust.76 While Meyerson et 
al.’s argument that swift trust development did not require past or future work 
relationships, there was consensus with Zolin’s conclusion that the smaller the labor pool 
from which a temporary group is drawn, the easier it is for swift trust to develop as there 
would exist a greater chance of interacting with an individual in the future. That possible 
future interaction increased the likelihood of swift trust development in the first 
interaction as an individual’s reputation as someone trustworthy would follow this 
person.  
2. Role Clarity and Trust 
Another factor identified as important to the formation of swift trust is role clarity. 
Swift trust in temporary groups is facilitated by “establishing and communicating clear 
roles within the team.”77 In temporary systems, strangers build trust faster by dealing 
with each other through their roles rather than through personal relationships. Uncertainty 
is muted as expectations are more stable and defined in terms of tasks and expertise.78 
Reducing uncertainty is important as uncertainty results in a reluctance to trust.79 When 
                                                 
73 Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 3. 
74 Ibid., 4. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 167.  
77 Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 4.  
78 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 173. 
79 Popa, “Initial Trust Formation in Temporary Small Task Groups,” 14. 
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studying trust among soldiers, Colonel Christopher Paparone similarly found that among 
the variables upon which swift trust is built is role clarity.80 Similarly, McEvily et al. 
identified reducing role redundancy as a way to increase trust within organizations.81 
Meyerson also posited, “blurring of roles will lead to a slower build of trust.”82  
3. Organizational Culture and Trust 
Several authors have argued that trust between groups or individuals is influenced 
by the organizational cultures those individuals represent. Organizational culture has 
been described as a community built on shared interests and obligations.83 An 
organization, influenced by its philosophy and the values of its leaders, makes choices 
that come to define its culture.84 Members learn these sets of shared assumptions and 
beliefs and consider them valid. These beliefs are then taught to new members of the 
organization and the culture becomes more ingrained.85 Trust forms more easily between 
members of the group with these shared beliefs as they can be relied on to act consistent 
with these beliefs.86 Alternatively, individuals tend to distrust those outside the 
organization and its culture because uncertainty exists as to how they will act in a given 
circumstance. Additionally, the more the organization creates a climate of trust within its 
organization, the better the conditions for swift trust to grow in the temporary group.87  
                                                 
80 Christopher R. Paparone, “The Nature of Soldierly Trust,” Military Review 82, no. 6 
(November/December 2002): 48, 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/225317990/1344A85BD66272433D9/1?accountid=1
2702. 
81 McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer, “Trust as an Organizing Principle,” 96. 
82 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 181. 
83 Rob Goffee and Gareth Jones, “What Holds The Modern Company Together?” Harvard Business 
Review 74, no. 6 (November/December 1996): 134. 
84 Pierre A. Balthazard, Robert A. Cooke, and Richard E. Potter, “Dysfunctional Culture, 
Dysfunctional Organization: Capturing the Behavioral Norms That Form Organizational Culture and Drive 
Performance,” Journal of Managerial Psychology 21, no. 8 (2006): 715, 
http://www.divisionescolpsic.org/organizacional/articulos-docs/Dysfun_culture_drive%20perfor.pdf. 
85 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 
17. 
86 Nahmod, “The Collaborative Capacity of the NYPD, FDNY, and EMS in New York City,” 16. 
87 Peder Hyllengren et al., “Swift Trust in Leaders in Temporary Military Groups,” Team Performance 
Management 17, no. 7/8 (2011): 357. 
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Paparone described U.S. Army culture as an impediment to swift trust, 
particularly regarding the changing nature of the soldiers’ work, and the history and 
culture of the organization. In The Nature of Soldierly Trust, Paparone describes the 
complex contemporary operating environment of soldiers and the need for the Army to 
adjust to these new complexities. Soldiers often find themselves working with soldiers 
from other units, law enforcement personnel, and relief workers from NGOs. The 
environment into which soldiers are thrust requires that they quickly establish working 
relationships with individuals, teams, and groups who are strangers to one another. 
According to Paparone, trust between the Army and other organizations, in furtherance of 
common objectives, is not part of the organization’s culture, which makes working with 
these groups more difficult.88 Meyerson et al. also identified the issue of organizational 
culture as a factor affecting swift trust or swift distrust.89 They found that in temporary 
systems “organizational culture, industry recipes, and cultural identity-based stereotypes” 
drive perceptions.90 
The lack of trust resulting from organizational culture has been identified as a 
cause preventing collaboration among emergency responders as well. In examining the 
failure of emergency response agencies to collaborate, Donahue and Tuohy argued that a 
culture of distrust exists between many of these organizations, and the lack of trust makes 
them either unable or unwilling to collaborate.91 The authors argued that the greater the 
significance of the incident, such as a major disaster or homeland security related 
incident, the greater the problems of trust, commitment to collaborate, and competition 
among emergency response agencies.92  
                                                 
88 Paparone, “The Nature of Soldierly Trust,” 46. 
89 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 182. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Amy K. Donahue and Robert V. Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of 
Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How Can We Learn From Them,” Homeland Security Affairs II, no. 
2 (July 2006): 6, http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.2.4. 
92 Ibid. 
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4. Trust and Communication  
Researchers identified trust as a factor influencing an effective interagency federal 
response at the Pentagon on 9/11.93 In comparing the responses to the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon, they noted greater interagency collaboration present at the 
Pentagon.94 In contrast, the emergency response agencies in New York City lacked the 
ability to collaborate adequately during the initial response.95 The literature identifies 
trust as a factor important to information sharing. This trust is vitally important as 
“coordinated action among a disparate group of actors depends fundamentally on their 
access to timely, valid information…” and the need for collaboration intensifies as the 
number of organizations involved increases and the incident grows.96 Similarly, FDNY 
Assistant Chief Joseph Pfeifer argued that building a “synergistic approach” to 
emergency response at interagency incidents requires the free flow of information among 
the different groups.97 Mishra also found that trust had a moderating effect on 
collaboration by increasing the “communication of undistorted, truthful, or candid 
information.”98 
E. CONCLUSION 
This literature review presented some of the scholarship on trust, swift trust, and 
the effect trust has on collaboration in general and among first responders. It provides a 
background to understanding the potential relationship between swift trust and 
collaborative interagency response. It further confirms that there exist many areas of 
homeland security in which groups and individuals from differing agencies must  
 
                                                 
93 Louise K. Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Responses to Terrorism and Other Extreme 
Events,” Publius 32, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 42. 
94 Ibid.; The 9/11 Commission Report, 314. 
95 The 9/11 Commission Report, 285. 
96 Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Responses to Terrorism and Other Extreme Events,” 30. 
97 Pfeifer, “Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced Responders at the World Trade 
Center,” 214. 
98 Mishra, “Organizational Responses to Crisis,” 273. 
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collaborate to accomplish tasks when emergency responders become simultaneously 
dependent on each other and vulnerable to each other’s actions and decisions, and where 
trust is a relevant factor.99  
                                                 
99 McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer, “Trust As an Organizing Principle,” 92–93.  
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III. SWIFT TRUST STUDIES 
Researchers conducted several studies to examine the formation of swift trust and 
the effectiveness of swift trust in temporary working groups. The studies examined in this 
section represent contexts other than emergency response. The author has chosen 
examples of temporary groups from the military/NGOs, business, and global team (or 
virtual) collaboration perspectives. Drawn from this research are several themes that 
serve as foundations for swift trust development. Section IV discusses NYC’s 
interagency response policies, procedures, and training to test the application of swift 
trust to emergency response in NYC.  
A. MILITARY GROUPS 
The contemporary roles and responsibilities of the U.S. military often require 
establishing working relationships with other groups with whom they have no previous 
personal or work experience. These groups include joint missions involving distinct 
military units, both within and between service branches, National Guard interaction with 
state and local authorities, and relief missions and projects involving military 
coordination with NGOs. Military leadership understands and emphasizes the necessity 
of working across agency boundaries. In recent years, the military has seen a shift both in 
the growing number and complexity of ad hoc teams formed on the ground for specific 
missions100 and the non-combat SSTR operations.101 This new reality is reflected in the 
development and education of military leaders. For instance, the U.S. Army Leadership 
Field Manual states, “Strategic leaders focus research and development efforts on 
achieving joint, interagency, and multinational synergy for success.”102 The military 
emphasizes joint operations to such an extent that officers who have not completed a joint 
duty assignment are precluded from promoting to the Brigadier General or Flag Staff 
                                                 
100 Paparone, “The Nature of Soldierly Trust,” 46. 
101 Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 1. 
102 United States Army, U.S. Army Field Manual, Army Leadership 6-22, (FM 22-100), 12–50, 
October 2006, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm6-22.pdf. 
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positions.103 In the interdisciplinary environment in which the military now works, 
researchers have begun to examine swift trust and its effectiveness in military groups. 
1. Unit Cohesion 
For years, the concept of cohesion has been widely accepted as either indicative 
of or responsible for a military unit’s success.104 However, as noted above, modern day 
military needs and structures may not provide the time and stability for the development 
of unit cohesion. Yet researchers found that when these traditional frameworks were 
broken up, new ones replaced them that allowed units, created ad hoc, to work effectively 
together. One group of researchers, embedded with the Israeli military, studied the 
formation of swift trust on temporary Israeli combat teams during the Al-Aqsa Intifada. 
At the time, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were caught off guard by the size and 
military power of the Palestinian forces in the occupied territory.105 Controlling the 
settlements and roadways required a reorganization and deployment of military units. The 
researchers conducted a qualitative study of these newly formed teams and found these 
“instant units” formed trust and worked effectively due to several factors. 
The researchers observed the first meeting between members of the differing 
teams to be crucial. The meeting, usually brief due to the exigent circumstances of the 
need for an ad hoc combat team in the first place, included the exchange of names, group 
affiliation, experience, task assignments, and division of labor.106 It usually occurred 
through private conversations between commanders of constituent units. These initial 
brief conversations reduced the uncertainty always present between groups with no 
previous relationship. One IDF commander noted the uncertainty that exists when joined 
together with a new group or individual, saying, “When you don’t know, it worries you. 
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You don’t know what his capabilities are, what he knows.”107 Since time pressures 
hindered team members from developing first hand information regarding each other, 
these temporary groups formed “stereotypical impressions” based on “category-driven 
information,”108 which often included the reputations of their individual unit and the 
organization from which they came. In addition to providing an initial orientation, the 
researchers found that reputations and the possibility of future interaction also served as a 
motivating factor to trust and be trustworthy as one’s reputation would follow with future 
interactions.109 Another interesting finding from this study was that trust formed and the 
group’s ability to manage uncertainty grew as the temporary group accomplished small 
tasks. This also had a cascading effect as trust between team members over less critical 
tasks spread into more meaningful operational matters.110 
Other interrelated factors contributing to swift trust in these groups included a 
willingness to share knowledge and learn from a different group. Similarly, the 
researchers found more trusting behavior between commanders and individuals with 
specialized expertise. A recognition of and deference to professional expertise existed 
regardless of military rank or overall command of the operation. Additionally, the 
researchers found that trust grew when tasks were assigned in a way that did not 
discriminate against a particular group, both in terms of the number of assignments and 
the quality of assignments. Lastly, they found that although groups differed, they were 
able to create a commonality using standard procedures and communication.111 They 
argued that such standardization is a way to “institutionalize” swift trust as new members 
of the group or team will already know and utilize the same procedures and language.  
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2. Team Identity 
While the above study involved IDF members from different units, another study 
examined swift trust in temporary teams formed across organizational boundaries. In this 
study, the researcher collected data from U.S. and foreign military officers with 
experience working in SSTR groups to determine whether swift trust formed and how 
organizational culture affected swift trust.112 The researcher also conducted interviews of 
individuals from organizations that responded to Hurricane Katrina, as well as 
participants in the Strong Angel III Disaster Response Demonstration that was designed 
to replicate a flu pandemic.113 This study found that workers in these cross-agency 
groups had difficulty establishing trust due to “perceived differences in organizational 
goals, strongly held negative organizational stereotypes of the other organizations, and 
perceived ideological differences.”114 It noted that swift trust could facilitate 
collaboration among military forces and NGOs if the individuals quickly perceive 
themselves to be part of a team. However, the research revealed this was unlikely to 
happen in these situations. The individuals forming these temporary SSTR teams were 
drawn from large organizations including the U.S. military, foreign militaries, and NGOs, 
which was found to be too large a labor pool and individual members could not view 
their new temporary group as a team.115 Additionally, this research revealed that the 
cohesiveness and culture of military teams make it difficult to develop trust with other 
organizations.116 
3. Organizational Culture 
While not a scientific study, a subject matter expert identified similar 
organizational cultural issues preventing swift trust between the military and other 
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agencies. U.S. Army Colonel Christopher Paparone found that while trust between 
soldiers has always been high, “trusting other agencies in the pursuit of common 
objectives is certainly not a strength of Army culture.”117 Paparone writes that swift trust 
in the military arises out of crisis. He argues that swift trust’s development is based upon 
several variables. Among those are reputation, perceptions of trustworthiness, the 
prospect of future interaction, and role clarity.118  
Paparone also describes several negative influences on the development of trust 
between military group members that he terms betrayals. The betrayals of swift trust 
include contract type, communication type, and competence type.119 In the first situation, 
contract type, groups or individuals betray expectations and boundaries that would 
involve a situation in which a group agrees to do something or abide by agreed upon 
rules, and fails to do it. The second, communication type, involves negatively impacting 
information sharing, feedback, and problem solving. Finally, competence betrayals 
involve disrespecting another’s skills or knowledge.120  
Paparone recommended that the Army continue training its members in inter-
organizational activities. However, he also recommended the Army urge other 
organizations to participate in combined group training sessions.121 Most importantly, he 
recommended that leaders find ways to allow greater input into trust and inter-
organizational activities from the bottom up. In his view, unit leaders have the most 
experience dealing with these issues of trust and are best suited to provide potential 
solutions.  
4. Swift Trust in Leaders 
Another study focused on factors that benefit or do not benefit the development of 
swift trust in leaders of temporary military groups. It consisted of surveying 591 military 
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officers and cadets in Norway and Sweden regarding their experience working in 
temporary groups, the effectiveness of the groups, and the attributes of the group 
leaders.122 The results were divided into two categories that affected swift trust in 
leaders, individual-related characteristics and relationship-related characteristics. The 
individual characteristics were represented in personal characteristics of the leader 
including that individual’s experience and competence. The relationship characteristics 
included communication, management style, and leadership. A similar number of 
positive responses occurred between the two categories; however, twice as many negative 
responses were received for relationship-related characteristics. The study found that 
leaders who met regularly and communicated consistently had a more positive impact on 
swift trust,123 which is consistent with the previous studies’ findings of the importance of 
communication to swift trust. 
5. Swift Trust in Military Groups—Themes 
 Swift trust formation is affected by perceptions of different organizational 
goals. 
 Organizational culture of military affects swift trust negatively. 
 Negative perceptions of other organizations hinder swift trust formation. 
 Swift trust is enhanced by action-based tasks. 
 Swift trust grows as small tasks are accomplished. 
 Swift trust is more easily developed when based on subject matter 
expertise. 
 Swift trust can be affected by the equitable distribution of group 
assignments, both in terms of the number of assignments and the quality 
of assignments. 
 Swift trust may be less likely if temporary group members are drawn from 
large labor pools. 
 The prospect of future interaction makes swift trust more likely. 
 Initial meetings between team leaders to identify roles and assigns tasks 
increases swift trust. 
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 Standardizing procedures and utilizing common language institutionalizes 
swift trust. 
 Leaders positively influence swift trust development through regular, 
consistent communication with the temporary group.  
B. BUSINESS GROUPS 
Much of the research into swift trust and temporary groups has focused, not 
surprisingly, in the private sector. Companies in a variety of industries are experiencing 
uncertainty due to economic conditions, information technologies, and changing 
corporate structures. Businesses engage in partnering, joint ventures, mergers, and other 
work arrangements to enhance profitability. These inter-organizational relationships deal 
with issues of trust. Professor Terry Adler studied the importance of trust and distrust in 
the formation of business agreements.124 He developed the Swift Trust Exercise to give 
business students experience in managing trust in a team environment. The exercise 
participants form contracts and other business agreements based upon their perceptions, 
team dynamics, and reputations of potential future business partners. Since contracts are 
agreements between two or more groups to perform certain duties, teams developing 
contract requirements do so based on perceptions of trust and distrust of the other groups. 
1. Swift Trust Exercise 
Adler’s Swift Trust Exercise assigned the participants into four teams consisting 
of five to eight people. Each team was given a scenario in which it was a business entity 
entering into an agreement with another. The scenarios develop further as the teams must 
draft work statements and define their partnerships. The scenarios give the teams various 
details about their prospective partners. The information varies depending on the team 
but describes details that can be positive, negative, or purposefully vague. In this way, the  
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researcher creates four general groups of teams, representing low trust/low distrust, high 
trust/low distrust, low trust/high distrust, and high trust/high distrust, based on the 
Lewicki et al. framework. (See Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1.   Integrating Trust and Distrust: Alternative Social Realities125 
For instance, the low trust/low distrust group attempts to work with an 
organization with which it has no previous relationship and little information on which to 
base decisions. The high trust/high distrust team is contracting with an organization it 
knows to be extremely competent based on past experiences. However, it is also aware of 
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some negative attributions of the group. The high trust/low distrust group is working with 
a known, competent firm with a good reputation. While the low trust/high distrust group 
is dealing with an organization it believes is trying to exploit it.  
The exercise highlights several key issues affecting swift trust. Among those are 
perception, distrust, competition, differing organizational goals, and leadership. In the 
exercise, a team manager leads each team and decisions are made based upon the 
perceptions formed by the information provided. The exercise enhances understanding of 
perception and its relation to trust and distrust. Adler demonstrates that perceptions of 
trust or distrust of the potential future business partner influence the actions taken toward 
the other group, specifically the contracts formed. Hard contracting makes the contract 
requirements explicit and is more likely in high distrust perceptions. In these instances, 
teams perceive their potential partner to have differing goals, motives, and concerns. 
Therefore, in the groups with high distrust, contracts were defined in detail.126 High 
distrust conditions are also more likely to escalate disputes between the parties. 
Additionally, these groups made caveats to their agreements, which allowed them to 
verify the potential partner’s work prior to fulfilling their duties. In high trust perceptions, 
soft contracting was more likely and requirements were less stringent, more informal, and 
offered more opportunities for conflict resolution.127 In these cases, teams perceived their 
potential partner to be trustworthy and felt assured their organizational goals did not 
conflict. 
The Swift Trust Exercise also examines swift trust between partners who have a 
competitive relationship. Exercise participants must consider the trust they put in a 
partner who may also be a competitor. In these cases, competitiveness increases distrust, 
which makes the participants wary of the partner group. Therefore, in these inter-
organizational settings, simultaneous issues of trust and distrust arise.128 Another 
interesting result of Adler’s exercise is that it demonstrated that trust perceptions 
involved both individuals and the teams as a group. Each group had a team manager who 
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integrated the varying individual trust perceptions into a team trust perception.129 
Organizations often realign individual perception or behavior to the group or team 
perception or behavior. Understanding how group perceptions of trust are formed and 
how an individual’s perception can be changed to conform to the group is important to 
the study of swift trust in temporary groups. 
2. Swift Trust in Business Groups—Themes 
 Group and individual perceptions influence swift trust.  
 Trust perceptions of individuals can be altered to align with the 
group perception.  
 Groups sometimes manage both a collaborative and competitive 
relationship. 
 High distrust leads to hard agreements or requirements for each 
party to follow. 
 High distrust is more likely to escalate disputes between the 
parties. 
 Low distrust leaves open the possibility for handling disagreements 
informally.  
 Group leaders influence and align individual group members’ trust 
perceptions with the group trust perception. 
C. VIRTUAL GROUPS 
Globalization and the interconnectedness of people and businesses create linkages 
between organizations previously unseen. Management and employees are distributed 
geographically, requiring a new understanding of work relationships. Virtual teams 
provide a solution to the pressures to increase flexibility and responsiveness while 
decreasing costs in dynamic business environments.130 These collaborations exhibit 
many of the same challenges of other temporary work groups and the research into these 
settings suggests that swift trust is possible, but fragile. 
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1. Global Virtual Teams 
While this paper explores the difficulty emergency responders have in creating 
and maintaining trust in face-to-face interactions, swift trust research also explores the 
challenges presented between members of global virtual teams. Today, companies rely on 
teams that interact electronically to run their everyday business.131 These virtual teams 
evolve in network organizations and develop due to advances in information and 
communication systems. Virtual teams, like other temporary groups, form rapidly to 
work on designated tasks with little time for relationship building. They consist of 
members with differing expertise and representing different cultures, and dissolve when 
the team goal is accomplished or the need for the team no longer exists. What 
differentiates these temporary groups is that they work without any face-to-face 
interaction.  
2. Case Study  
Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa and Dorothy E. Leidner conducted a study involving 350 
graduate students from around the world.132 They divided the students into teams 
consisting of four to six members. The teams were self-managing and charged with three 
group tasks. The first two assignments lasted one week each and were voluntary. The 
final project was mandatory and lasted four weeks. The only communication among the 
team members was through electronic means. The research questions the study attempted 
to answer include 1) Can trust exist in global virtual teams? 2) How might trust be 
developed in such teams? 3) What are the communication behaviors that might facilitate 
the development of trust? 
The team members completed surveys of their experience and the researchers 
reviewed those along with all team communications. Based on these measurements, the 
researchers divided the teams into four broad categories: those that began the project with 
low trust and ended with low trust (LoLo), those that began low and ended high (LoHi), 
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those that began high and ended low (HiLo), and those that began high and ended high 
(HiHi). Twelve teams, three from each category, were then selected for case analysis.  
The cases revealed that these temporary teams dealt with issues of vulnerability, 
uncertainty, and expectations. The researchers found that the teams that ended with low 
trust (LoLo and HiLo) were less able to deal with these issues than the other teams and, 
as a result, were generally ineffective. The commonalities observed in the teams that 
began their project with low initial trust (LoLo and LoHi) included a failure to make 
social introductions and a lack of enthusiasm or optimism for the group project. The 
teams that began with higher levels of initial trust (HiLo and HiHi) experienced the 
opposite, as they were both enthusiastic and engaged in social dialogue from the initial 
interactions. The groups that ended the project with low levels of trust (LoLo and HiLo) 
generally had fewer and less predictable communications, negative leadership, and a lack 
of individual initiative. Also, these teams were unable to cope with the initial task 
uncertainty and failed to clarify tasks among group members. Interestingly, the teams that 
began with high levels of trust and ended with low levels (HiLo) started the project with 
enthusiasm and social dialogue but were unable to transition from social dialogue to more 
task oriented communication. In contrast, the teams that ended with high levels of trust 
(LoHi and HiHi) were able to make that transition. They also benefitted from greater and 
more predictable communication.133 The most effective teams, the ones that began the 
project with high levels of trust and ended it with high levels (HiHi), started the project 
with a great deal of excitement and group members were able to view themselves as part 
of a team.134 Also, these groups and the (LoHi) groups communicated messages of 
encouragement and support for other team members throughout the project, even through 
setbacks and failures. These groups and the factors that influenced swift trust are 
identified in Table 2. 
 
                                                 




Table 2.   Within and Cross-Category Case Analysis135 
In answering whether the virtual teams exhibited trusting behavior, the study 
concluded that the trust of the teams that ended the project with higher levels (LoHi and 
HiHi) might have been swift trust.136 They cited consistent communication and the 
successful transition from personal to action-based trust. The second research question 
asked how trust might develop in virtual teams. Of the 29 teams used in statistical 
analysis, only four teams began with low initial trust levels and ended the project with 
high trust levels. This suggests that the first communications, albeit electronic ones in this 
case, or the lack of communications, set the tone for how group members interrelated 
throughout the project.137 This result seems consistent with Meyerson et al.’s view that in 
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temporary groups, unless trust forms quickly, “one may never trust at all.”138 The last 
part of the study attempted to determine whether communication facilitated trust in the 
virtual groups. The study found that the teams that identified with higher levels of trust 
engaged in continuous communication and feedback and were better able to problem 
solve and resolve conflicts with technical and task uncertainty. The teams that did not 
become focused on communication of tasks reported low levels of trust at the end of the 
project, and experienced poor team results. 
3. Swift Trust in Virtual Groups—Themes 
 Consistent communication makes initial trust more likely. 
 Communication that transitions from social to action-based 
positively influences swift trust. 
 Initial communications between group members are vitally 
important to developing trust.  
 Positive leadership and enthusiasm for the group project fostered 
higher levels of trust. 
 Poor initial interactions made trust unlikely later in the group 
collaboration. 
 Substantive feedback and encouragement even through group 
failures facilitate trust. 
D. THEME SUMMARY 
Prior studies of the development of swift trust in temporary groups have shown 
that several factors enhance or hinder the development of swift trust. The following swift 
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1. Swift Trust Matrix 
 Military Business Virtual 
Factors    
Competition X X  
Organizational Culture X X  
Perception X X  
Communication X X X 
Initial Interaction X X X 
Task Assignment X  X 
Action Based X  X 
Reputation X X  
Future Interaction X X  
Role Clarity X X X 
Team Identity X X X 
Contracts  X  
Dispute Resolution  X  
Large Labor Pools X   
Leader Influence X X X 
Standardized Procedures X X  
Table 3.   Swift Trust Matrix 
The researcher conducted a secondary analysis on themes collected from the 
above studies into swift trust in temporary groups found to affect the formation of swift 
trust. Prior researchers identified elements that consistently affect swift trust between 
groups or individuals. The most common themes found in the variety of contexts 
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examined with relevance to emergency responders include initial interactions of group 
members, consistent communication, identifying clear roles, forming a team identity, 
group leader influence, and organizational culture.  
 41
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. INTERAGENCY RESPONSE IN NYC 
Most interagency incidents in NYC are addressed professionally and with some 
attempt to collaborate and coordinate agency missions. However, barriers exist that 
prevent seamless collaboration and coordination in every case. Interagency incidents are 
complex endeavors that require a synergistic response from emergency response 
agencies.139 These incidents “are representative of the complex adaptive systems in 
which the nation’s first responders must operate.”140 When responders arrive at the scene 
of a multi-agency incident, they exhibit the qualities described in much of the research 
into temporary groups. In these instances, responders focus on accomplishing specific 
tasks, usually under severe time pressures. They must work through issues of uncertainty 
and trust that exist when working in groups or teams with which people are unfamiliar. 
This section analyzes interagency response in NYC and attempts to determine what 
factors exist that foster or inhibit swift trust consistent with the themes identified for swift 
trust formation.  
B. BACKGROUND 
When the author began this research, he described the problem to a police officer 
friend who works in a mid-sized police department. The friend wondered why such a 
problem existed as most firefighters and police officers in his jurisdiction had some 
familiarity and personal interaction with each other. For that reason, some background 
information on the NYPD and FDNY is necessary. Although often spoken of collectively 
as “first responders,” some might be surprised to know how little personal interaction 
police officers and firefighters have in NYC. The lack of familiarity between individual 
officers and firefighters exists for several reasons. First, the FDNY has approximately 
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14,000 uniformed members consisting of fire and EMS personnel.141 The NYPD has 
approximately 34,500 uniformed members.142 Personnel transfers and promotions almost 
always entail moving to new assignments, both in terms of responsibilities and 
geographic locations within NYC. Additionally, agencies this large generally hire new 
people and lose veterans to retirement in fairly large numbers. Furthermore, work 
schedules of the two agencies differ greatly, which prevents individual police officers and 
firefighters who work in the same neighborhoods from interacting on a consistent basis. 
For instance, police officers and firefighters work different hours, and have different start 
and end times for their shifts that add to the infrequency with which individuals may 
interact. Furthermore, fire company response areas are not geographically aligned with 
local police precinct response areas. Additionally, attempts at interaction through 
participation in interagency exercises have marginal value in establishing personal 
relationships that could be beneficial to traditional trust during an interagency incident. 
Due to the above reasons, it is unlikely the same individuals who “practiced” together 
would respond to the actual emergency together. For police officers and firefighters with 
little personal interaction, attempting to work together in a collaborative way at an 
incident presents a problem. The themes identified as foundations for swift trust could 
present a solution.  
C. INITIAL COMMUNICATION AND INTERACTION 
1. Inability to Communicate 
The swift trust studies suggest that a positive initial interaction and 
communication between group members or their leaders, at the beginning of the group’s 
formation, is vital to fostering swift trust.143 Additionally, continued regular 
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communication is important for sustaining that trust,144 which presents a problem at 
interagency incidents as communication between agencies is problematic for several 
reasons. In NYC, members of the FDNY and NYPD are sometimes either reluctant or 
simply unable to communicate with each other early on at an incident scene. This lack of 
communication creates uncertainty and inhibits swift trust. Types of information often 
not communicated between agencies include tactical operations already completed or still 
in need of completion, adequacy of assets and personnel on scene, and tactics chosen to 
resolve the emergency by the first arriving agency. Additionally, while CIMS directs the 
agency with a “core competency” in a particular subject matter to give tactical direction 
to members of other agencies engaged in those operations, that tactical direction between 
the FDNY and NYPD is rarely given.145 A larger discussion of this problem follows in a 
later section of this paper. 
The lack of a brief personal interaction or communication at the beginning of an 
incident also potentially creates a sense of distrust as the lack of information sharing 
could be viewed as a deliberate attempt to deny the other agency information. The 
distinction between the reasons for not sharing information is important as the data 
suggests a perception that information is being deliberately denied or purposefully vague 
creates high distrust. While the potential exists that the failure to provide information is 
deliberate, it is just as likely that the reasons are due to no fault of the responders. For 
instance, first arriving responders might be engaged in tactical operations or they could 
be unaware that another agency has arrived on scene. Furthermore, the lack of 
information could result from the lack of interoperable technology or the physical 
logistics of the incident site. For example, if members of one agency are operating 
somewhere inside a building or in a subway station, they may have no way to transmit 
information to the next arriving responders from another agency. Although FDNY radios 
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can communicate with some NYPD radios,146 firefighters, police officers, or first line 
supervisors almost never communicate this way during the initial stages of an incident. 
2. Inability to Meet  
One issue preventing an initial interaction stems from a discrepancy existing 
during the initial stages of many interagency responses between the number of 
firefighters and the number of police officers the agencies dispatch. The FDNY sends 
multiple units to most potential interagency emergencies. The FDNY has a greater 
capability to utilize manpower to establish command posts and exchange information 
while not detracting from the simultaneous tactical operation. Each engine company is 
staffed with an officer (either a Lieutenant or Captain) and four firefighters. Each ladder 
and rescue company is staffed with an officer and five firefighters. Additionally, a 
Battalion Chief and firefighter also respond to most interagency incidents. It is not 
uncommon to have 20 to 30 FDNY members arrive at an incident within four or five 
minutes of being dispatched. Among those FDNY members is a clearly identifiable Chief 
Officer who establishes incident command.  
In contrast, NYPD patrol units consist of two police officers. The NYPD 
Emergency Service Units (ESU) are also staffed by two members. ESU officers hold the 
rank of detective but usually operate in a SWAT/Rescue function rather than an 
investigative capacity. Generally, NYPD members leave their vehicles unmanned in the 
vicinity of the incident and proceed to the point of operation. The FDNY always leaves 
some members outside the building or immediate incident scene, near the fire apparatus. 
FDNY protocols require regular updates to the FDNY dispatcher, which is primarily 
accomplished through the radio in the fire truck. The NYPD, on the other hand, leave 
their vehicles as they communicate with police dispatchers through portable radios. The 
result is that sometimes fire department units arrive at an incident only to find an 
unoccupied NYPD vehicle and with no way of obtaining information from the NYPD 
officers on scene.  
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Another issue preventing the initial interaction and communication is the 
discrepancy in ranking officers at a scene. As mentioned above, FDNY responses always 
include Lieutenants and Captains, and routinely include Battalion Chiefs. NYPD 
responses to many common interagency incidents rarely include any officer above the 
rank of Sergeant initially, the equivalent of an FDNY Lieutenant. When the agencies 
arrive at a scene simultaneously, there is usually no NYPD representative of equivalent 
rank to the ranking FDNY representative willing or able to take part in a unified 
command. This discrepancy of who should talk to who creates an awkward situation for 
members of both agencies. Additionally, as ESU officers are detectives and are under a 
separate command, an FDNY Lieutenant, Captain, or Chief may potentially be conferring 
with an NYPD officer or Sergeant who either lacks authority or is unwilling to direct the 
ESU member’s actions.  
3. Shortcomings of Unified Command During the Initial Meeting 
CIMS requires the establishment of a unified command structure at unified 
command incidents. Representatives from each agency are directed to determine 
objectives, strategies, and plans jointly.147 If the FDNY arrives after another agency is on 
scene at a unified command incident, the FDNY incident commander is directed to confer 
with the other agency representative at the established command post.148 In instances in 
which the FDNY arrives and a command post has not been established, the FDNY 
incident commander establishes one, which might seem to indicate a meeting of agency 
representatives always occurs. However, the NYPD does not establish command posts 
initially. Furthermore, in the early stages of an incident, it is uncommon for an NYPD 
officer or Sergeant to approach an FDNY Battalion Chief to establish a unified 
command.149 This often leaves the FDNY commander at the command post without an 
NYPD counterpart after the first arriving members from the NYPD have already 
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deployed and are engaged in tactical operations. Attempting to build trust and coordinate 
the plan later in the incident becomes more difficult. Instead, the agencies continue the 
initial operation by addressing the incident separately, and without communicating and 
coordinating.  
4. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD 
As the swift trust studies suggest, a failure to meet and communicate early in a 
temporary group formation results in temporary group members less likely to form swift 
trust. In the study of Israeli military groups, the researchers identified the first meeting, 
albeit brief, between leaders of differing units to be pivotal to establishing trust.150 
Similarly, the study of virtual groups found either no interaction between team members 
at the beginning of the group project or poor first interactions to be so damaging to trust 
development that few of the virtual teams were able to progress from low initial trust to 
high trust.  
Communication was also found to be vital to swift trust development. The swift 
trust exercise demonstrated that continuous communication and verification of their 
partner groups was effective in building trust and lowering distrust between business 
partners. The study of virtual teams also demonstrated that the high trust groups were 
those that communicated regularly. This finding was similar in the study of military 
groups in which researchers found that communicating even simple tasks early in group 
settings both established trust and positively influenced trust later during more 
complicated tasks. Additionally, in military organizations, the lack of communication 
was seen as an inhibitor or betrayal of trust.151 In applying the swift trust factors of initial 
meeting and communication to the reality of interagency responses in NYC, one can see 
the difficulty existing between the FDNY and NYPD in forming swift trust. This is not to 
suggest that the failure of communication always leads to ineffective results. In fact, most 
incidents are ultimately handled professionally in spite of a lack of communication or  
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interagency meeting. However, this lack of initial communication makes swift trust less 
likely, and in cases in which the incidents develop into prolonged or complex endeavors, 
collaboration and coordination becomes more difficult. 
D. ROLE CLARITY 
Another area presenting difficulty for the formation of swift trust between the 
FDNY and NYPD is the establishment of clear roles at interagency incidents. The swift 
trust data determined clarifying roles early in a project was important to the development 
of swift trust.152 Role clarity helps reduce uncertainty that causes the slower build of 
trust. Identifying clear roles at many interagency incidents in NYC is difficult for several 
reasons. First, as mentioned above, FDNY and NYPD responders have difficulty seeking 
out counterparts early in an operation to share information regarding their capabilities or 
tactics, or to decide on strategies. The initial meeting and communication does not occur 
and roles are not clearly defined. Instead, units operate independently without 
communicating their roles or understanding the roles of others, and swift trust is unlikely.  
1. Role Redundancy 
Second, despite years of complaints and criticism, NYC first responders operate 
under an incident management system that perpetuates role redundancy. It is unfortunate 
enough that NYPD and FDNY members fail to communicate their roles and understand 
the other’s, but CIMS only increases the confusion through no fault of the individual 
responders. For instance, search and rescue is often conducted simultaneously by the 
FDNY and NYPD, which is common at structural collapses and water rescues. 
Additionally, groups work independently of each other rather than collaboratively, which 
results in inefficient and redundant operations. It is not uncommon to have police and fire 
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units operating separately without integrating their search plan or establishing a unified 
command. In some cases, these incidents even grow into public interagency disputes.153 
CIMS attempts to define agency roles and responsibilities at various incidents. 
However, CIMS actually exacerbates collaboration problems by blurring agency roles 
and capabilities, and encouraging competition by designating command of some 
incidents to the agency that arrives first regardless of the individual responder’s training, 
equipment, or experience.154 For instance, an automobile accident requiring extrication of 
a victim is designated an FDNY/NYPD single command incident (first to arrive).155 In 
other words, the agency arriving first commands the incident. However, it does not 
account for the manpower, capabilities, or equipment of that initial agency on scene. 
Additionally, while the system is established as a framework for command, it does not, 
nor could it, clearly delineate operational roles and responsibilities for all scenarios. 
Unfortunately, a number of incidents occur, most notably scaffold emergencies (requiring 
rescues) that the document does not clearly identify but fall within the training and 
capabilities of both the FDNY and NYPD. While the FDNY “core competency” of 
responsibility for life safety and search and rescue appears to put the FDNY in command 
of these incidents, and also responsible for giving tactical direction to any other agency 
involved, the reality is that NYPD ESU officers receive training and equipment to 
address these as well, which ultimately leads to confusion when both agencies arrive at 
the incident. The lack of clearly defined roles is an impediment to swift trust, and 
ultimately, collaboration. As noted in the studies, swift trust is facilitated by “establishing 
and communicating clear roles within the team”156 
Some argue that redundancy is a good thing because it provides a safeguard. The 
thinking is that it is better to have both agencies capable of accomplishing the job. This 
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view was expressed by a former OEM official who stated it was, “better to have two 
agencies with that go getter, can-do attitude to bring to bear on the kinds of difficult 
situations that we have in New York City, than to have no agencies that can do that.”157 
This thinking confuses resiliency and duplication.158 In a resilient system, the redundancy 
is reserved as a back up to protect against the potential failure of the primary system. 
When the FDNY and NYPD spend money on the same training and equipment, and then 
respond to the same incidents at the same time, an unnecessary duplication of services 
occurs. It is also confusing and demoralizing to the responders who feel they have the 
training, motivation, and capability to accomplish the task, only to arrive and find another 
agency doing what they believe to be their primary job. Instead of having a back-up 
system in place as a protection for the primary system, the FDNY and NYPD role 
redundancy creates and encourages the two proud agencies to compete for primacy. 
Competition among agencies is repeatedly cited as a reason for the failure to 
collaborate.159 In cases like these, in which a blurring of roles arises, swift trust 
development is unlikely.  
2. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD 
One of the factors identified as important to swift trust development is 
establishing clear roles for group members. The virtual collaboration study found that 
groups with the highest levels of trust established roles for all members. The study into 
military organizations and NGOs working together in SSTR operations found 
establishing clear roles necessary for swift trust but difficult to accomplish.160 That 
research found that the unpredictable nature of the work and grouping of individuals with 
different backgrounds and levels of training made establishing clear roles difficult.161 
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The FDNY and NYPD face similar problems in this area. Levels of training and 
experience among responders, both within and between agencies, differ, as do procedures 
and protocols. In addition, FDNY and NYPD members have the added burden of an 
incident management system that blurs the roles of responders that ultimately hinders 
swift trust. 
E. TEAM IDENTITY 
The swift trust studies also support the notion that swift trust is less likely to 
develop if groups are unable to create a feeling that the new temporary group is one team 
with a common mission.162 They point out that leader enthusiasm for the temporary 
group and distributing assignments equitably was a factor in establishing the team 
mindset.163 Despite the importance of developing a team approach to interagency 
incidents, FDNY and NYPD members are ill equipped to establish that mindset early in 
an incident. The NYPD and FDNY are extremely professional and effective operating 
independently, and the majority of emergency responses in NYC are within the 
capabilities of a single agency. Additionally, given the scarcity of large-scale interagency 
incidents, little practical opportunity exists to develop a cross-agency team mindset. Even 
at standard interagency incidents, many only see their agency’s mission and are unable to 
view their mission as part of a larger mission. That larger mission is one in which a 
variety of agency goals may have to be accomplished simultaneously, and without 
interference from another. The agencies have differing priorities that, at times, conflict. 
For instance, in the case of a hazardous materials incident, the FDNY is concerned with 
mitigating the problem, decontaminating people, and treating and transporting injured 
persons. The NYPD focuses on investigating the incident to determine if a criminal or 
terrorist connection exists and preserving the scene for evidence collection. Both 
organizations have important missions that could benefit from a team approach to the 
problem.  
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1. NYC Urban Search and Rescue Team—NY-TF1 
The NIMS, as represented through CIMS, provides a framework through which to 
view a particular agency’s role as part of an overall team mission. However, for the 
reasons stated earlier, attempting to establish this system early in an interagency incident 
is difficult. However, some FDNY and NYPD members do work together in teams 
successfully. The Urban Search and Rescue Team, New York Task Force 1 (NY-TF1), is 
the only one in the country comprised equally of police officers and firefighters.164 This 
group deploys to disasters outside of NYC and forms into search, rescue, and support 
teams or task forces by mixing members of both agencies based on expertise. Task force 
leadership is shared and transferred with each deployment. The task force model has 
proven successful and was studied as a best practice for enhancing NYC interagency 
collaboration by Battalion Chief Joseph Duggan in his thesis, The New York City Urban 
Search and Rescue Team: A Case of Interagency Effectiveness.165 It is ironic that for 
police officer and firefighter members of NY-TF1 to work so collaboratively during 
deployments, they must ignore standard NYC emergency response practices. It should be 
noted also that when NY-TF1 deploys to an incident, task force leaders meet and roles 
are clearly defined at the outset.166 
NY-TF1 provides an excellent example of trust between members of a temporary 
interagency group performing tasks in a coordinated and collaborative fashion that 
individual components of the group could not accomplish alone. Each task force 
component is critical to the success of the overall mission and team members “do not 
operate outside of their assigned role and position.”167 When the NY-TF1 deploys, roles 
are established and no duplication of effort occurs. Currently, barriers exist among other 
members of the FDNY and NYPD in NYC preventing this “one team” approach.  
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To develop a team identity, members must be familiar with the operational 
abilities of their agency counterparts. Members of the NY-TF1 receive cross training with 
their counterpart’s disciplines. They also operate under standard operating procedures 
and use standardized equipment, which differs from typical FDNY and NYPD members 
in NYC who have little knowledge of their counterpart’s procedures, equipment, or 
capabilities. Additionally, unlike interagency incidents in NYC, members of NY-TF1 
utilize common language and terms to communicate with colleagues during an 
emergency incident. Despite direction to refrain from using agency specific language,168 
interagency incidents often involve the use of agency specific jargon and codes foreign to 
members of other agencies. Additionally, in NYC, safety standards appear to differ 
between agencies. Safety actions common to FDNY members, such as de-energizing 
electric power prior to working near energized subway rails or stabilizing vehicles prior 
to extricating victims, do not seem to be priorities for NYPD ESU members. Perhaps they 
lack the needed manpower to accomplish these support tasks simultaneously with the 
rescue tasks. These differences in protocols and procedures prevent the formation of a 
team identity and inhibit trust and collaboration. As one agency attempts to abide by its 
agency specific safety protocols, another agency continues with the operation. A team 
approach to these incidents requires the FDNY and NYPD to follow the same safety 
protocols, utilize the same procedures, and communicate using the same language at 
interagency incidents. 
2. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD 
The study of Israeli military units found the standardization of language and 
procedures enabled swift trust development and, more importantly, began the process of 
institutionalizing swift trust.169 These differences may seem small, but they serve to 
enhance the feeling of unfamiliarity and prevent swift trust formation within the group. 
Establishing a team identity was integral to the formation of swift trust in several of the 
studies. In the virtual collaboration study, the groups with the highest levels of trust 
                                                 
168 Fire Department of the City of New York, Communications Manual, Protocol for the Use of 
Interoperability Frequencies, ch. 11, add. 3, November 16, 2005, 1.  
169 Ben-Shalom, Lehrer, and Ben-Ari, “Cohesion During Military Operations,” 76. 
 53
identified with and referred to other members as a “team” and a “family.”170 One 
researcher found that participants’ perception that they belong to a new temporary team is 
an initial condition for swift trust.171 In contrast, the failure to develop a team identity 
was found to be an inhibitor of swift trust. The study of military units and NGOs found 
teams had difficulty forming swift trust because they could not perceive a common goal 
and the individuals involved were drawn from large organizations and likely would not 
know each other or have any prospects of working together again in the future.172 
Similarly, firefighters and police officers who come together at an emergency incident 
have different procedures and communication. They sometimes have differing priorities 
and goals, which makes swift trust formation more difficult as the individuals are less 
likely to perceive themselves as part of one team. 
F. LEADERSHIP 
In each of the various swift trust studies explored above, leaders influenced the 
development of swift trust. Expressing enthusiasm for the temporary team, assigning 
tasks equitably, communicating clear roles for group members, and providing 
constructive feedback were all seen as positively influencing swift trust. Whereas 
expressing negativity toward the group or project, not communicating or interacting with 
the group, and criticizing publicly without constructive direction were all viewed as 
hindering swift trust. This situation poses another problem for emergency response in 
NYC as some in the FDNY feel the interagency protocols, and their enforcement, 
marginalize FDNY efforts.  
1. Negative Trust Perceptions 
Many leaders in the FDNY believe the NYPD does not follow interagency 
protocols consistently.173 A survey of FDNY Chiefs recently found that while 86% of 
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those responding to the survey believed the FDNY operated according to interagency 
protocols most of the time, almost 89% of respondents believed other agencies followed 
protocols half of the time or less.174 Additionally, 85% of those responding to the same 
survey believed the FDNY sometimes received delayed notification to incidents 
involving multiple agencies.175 In NYC, calls to 911 are received first by civilian NYPD 
operators. After an initial screening, notification is made electronically to the fire 
department dispatchers if fire department response is deemed necessary.176 This delay in 
notification could potentially result in longer response times for the FDNY to multi-
agency incidents. This delay also further erodes morale and increases negativity as some 
of these incidents are “first to arrive” single command incidents, and by the time the 
FDNY arrives, the incident may be resolved by another agency, which is usually the 
NYPD. If the FDNY Chiefs’ survey represents their feelings or perceptions of 
interagency incidents, it is likely those perceptions and feelings are transferred to the 
group as well.  
2. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD 
In Adler’s swift trust exercise, he found the group leader influenced trust 
perceptions and aligned individual perceptions of trust to the group perception. 
According to the recent Chiefs’ survey, a general feeling of distrust exists regarding the 
interagency incident management system. Additionally, a feeling of encroachment by the 
NYPD into areas traditionally reserved for the fire service prevails. It is hard for leaders 
in the FDNY to show enthusiasm for an interagency system many believe to be unfair. 
The goal of interagency collaboration should be to utilize an agency’s skill and expertise 
to accomplish a joint mission. However, in some areas, skills overlap. In the NYC 
emergency response context, this overlap results in competition and suspicion between 
the NYPD and FDNY. Suspicion of one’s competitor is natural despite whatever hurried 
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temporary collaboration is being formed.177 To establish swift trust with a competitor, 
Adler’s swift trust exercise demonstrated the importance of defining agreements. 
However, if the agreements between partners (in this case CIMS) are violated or too 
vague, swift trust cannot form. In addition, as the Chiefs’ survey suggested, a perception 
exists that others do not follow the agreement (CIMS). Paparone described this belief as a 
contract type betrayal of swift trust. This perception of violation of trust, whether true or 
not, further harms swift trust formation.  
G. ORGANIZATIONAL BIAS 
Perhaps the biggest impediment to the formation of swift trust between the FDNY 
and NYPD is organizational bias. Organizational bias has the potential to affect any of 
the other elements of swift trust negatively. It can preclude communication, role 
identification, task division, and the team mindset necessary for swift trust. It can also 
negatively influence leadership to distrust other organizations and transfer that distrust to 
subordinates. To understand organizational or group bias, it is helpful to understand the 
foundations to a person’s social identity and membership in a group.  
1. Social Identity Theory 
Under social psychologist Henri Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory (SIT), individuals 
gain positive self-identity through membership in a group, which sometimes results in 
negative attribution of others not part of the group. He described social identity as “that 
part of the individuals’ self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their 
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership.”178 Generally, individuals of a particular group 
seek positive differentiation between themselves and others. Comparisons are made that 
are more favorable to the in-group and in a way to make them appear better than relevant 
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out-groups.179 This results in a likelihood of positive stereotypes of the in-group and 
negative stereotypes of the out-group. Not surprisingly, this makes swift trust formation 
between the groups difficult. Zolin described the difficulty forming swift trust and 
establishing interpersonal working relationships between U.S. military organizations and 
NGOs due to negative stereotypes of the other organizations.180 
The in-group shares an organizational culture generally regarded as a set of shared 
assumptions and beliefs that members of an organization learn and consider valid. Trust 
is formed more easily between members of the in-group with these shared beliefs as they 
can be relied on to act consistent with these beliefs.181 Alternatively, individuals tend to 
distrust those outside the organization and its culture because it is unclear how they will 
act in a given circumstance. The lack of trust resulting from organizational bias has been 
identified as a cause preventing collaboration among emergency responders.182 In 
discussing how organizational bias influences first responders, FDNY Assistant Chief 
Joseph Pfeifer wrote: 
Social identity that promotes the power of one organization over another 
produces two social outcomes during complex incidents. First, it creates a 
positive in-group bias toward those who are part of the same group and a 
negative out-group bias against those who are part of an alternate group. . . 
Second, when under stress, people feel little obligation to share valuable 
information with those outside their group since the responsibility for 
acting is diffused within their group.183 
2. Information Sharing  
Associated with and adding to the difficulty in overcoming group bias is the rival 
nature and history of the NYPD and FDNY. To form swift trust and begin to view the 
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other group as a collaborative partner, the competitive culture between the organizations 
must change. Intergroup competition manifests itself by preventing both swift trust and 
effective collaboration and coordination. Refusing or failing to share information is a 
manifestation of organizational bias.184 In contrast, openly sharing information and 
knowledge was seen as beneficial to the creation of swift trust in military groups.185 The 
problem of organizational bias was seen at the World Trade Center on 9/11 when critical 
information was not shared between the emergency response agencies.186 Although his 
larger argument is that organizational biases prevented information sharing, Chief Pfeifer 
argued that the competitive natures of the FDNY and NYPD, and the distrust that existed 
between the groups, created a long-standing bias on a systematic level that prevented 
collaboration.  
3. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD 
While organizational bias presents a major impediment to swift trust, some hope 
exists of changing the organizational cultures to be more trusting of the other 
organization. Despite group differences, individual police officers and firefighters share 
many of the same traits and values. Members of both groups often have similar 
backgrounds, come from similar neighborhoods, and attain similar levels of education. 
They are also dedicated public servants. However, despite these individual similarities, 
group bias still exists as categorizing the world and identifying individuals by the groups 
to which they belong are the foundation of intergroup relations.187 Tajfel argued that 
categorization minimizes differences within groups and exaggerates differences between 
groups.188 
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Cross categorization is a theory focusing on the creation of overlapping 
categorizations to reduce group bias.189 In this approach, individuals' cross categories and 
view themselves as members of multiple groups. For instance, in the emergency 
responder context, firefighters and police officers may arrive at a hazardous materials 
incident. Some members of each group may also have hazardous materials expertise. In 
this scenario, four groups are created: police officers without hazardous materials 
expertise, police officers with hazardous materials expertise, firefighters without 
hazardous materials expertise and firefighters with hazardous materials expertise. The 
creation of additional categories makes intergroup distinctions more complex190 and aids 
in the reduction of group bias as members of the original groups (police and fire) now 
share common categories. It also allows individuals to recognize that differences exist 
within the in-group, which also reduces the significance of differences between the 
groups. 
H. INTERAGENCY TRAINING 
While the above sections describe the foundations to swift trust and the barriers 
that exist preventing swift trust between the FDNY and NYPD, it is important to also 
examine whether the FDNY training methods used to improve collaboration foster trust 
between individuals of different agencies or whether they affect trust at all. FDNY 
firefighters and officers receive interagency training in a variety of ways. All chiefs and 
most captains received CIMS training prior to NYC’s adoption of CIMS.191 Additionally, 
officers and chiefs receive ICS and CIMS refreshers prior to or just following promotion 
to each new rank. These refreshers usually consist of classroom training and PowerPoint 
presentations and online ICS courses. FDNY officers and chiefs conduct the classroom 
training. Furthermore, the FDNY produced condensed ICS and CIMS manuals to govern 
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FDNY responses that are available to all firefighters, officers, and chiefs through the 
FDNY Intranet. The entire CIMS document devotes one page to training and notes the 
OEM will oversee a common CIMS training curriculum.192 The OEM does not train 
FDNY personnel in CIMS protocols and the classes are not conducted jointly with other 
agencies. The OEM allows agencies latitude to implement and train its own members. 
This training does little to affect swift trust. When conducted with personnel 
solely from one’s agency, discussions are less productive and sometimes devolve into a 
complaint session about incidents in which procedures were not followed. As the only 
members in the room are of the same agency, the complaints generally produce a one-
sided conversation. Without personnel from OEM or the NYPD to give an alternate 
perspective, little is learned except to reinforce an opinion or perception. These 
discussions would be more productive if FDNY and NYPD personnel were giving their 
perspectives to each other. 
Other interagency training opportunities include drills and tabletop exercises. 
Although the FDNY attempts to give these opportunities to as many members as 
possible, in general, these drills are infrequent and the department is unable to ensure all 
personnel receive the training. Additionally, interagency drills and tabletop exercises, 
while attempting to familiarize members with some operational capabilities of other 
agencies at a particular incident, do little to enhance long-term personal trust and even 
less for swift trust. These training exercises never involve creating mixed teams of NYPD 
and FDNY members. Additionally, in the author’s experience, he has never seen either 
the NYPD or FDNY practice giving tactical direction to the other (as required under 
CIMS) at an interagency drill. Additionally, too often these drills are designed by and 
involve members assigned to training positions outside of response operations. These 
individuals are unlikely to be initial responders to an interagency incident.  
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I. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: SWIFT TRUST AS PRACTICED 
WITHIN THE FDNY 
One way to illuminate the difficulties forming swift trust between the FDNY and 
NYPD is to demonstrate how it works within the FDNY. Swift trust exists and forms 
among firefighters each day. Throughout NYC, firefighters and fire officers with little 
history of working together find ways to collaborate and accomplish tasks. The case can 
be seen most vividly when examining the FDNY’s practice of transferring newly 
promoted lieutenants, captains, and chiefs to new firehouses in areas of the city in which 
they have not worked previously. Prior to assignment to a permanent unit, the new officer 
begins to “cover” or work in different units each tour, which often means the fire officer 
is meeting the firefighters he is working with on a given tour for the first time. 
Additionally, staffing shortages or surpluses among firefighters require equalization of 
manpower that results in firefighters sometimes being detailed to other units in the city 
for an individual tour. It is not uncommon for an officer or firefighter to enter the 
firehouse and immediately receive an alarm requiring an emergency response. In this 
scenario, the members have barely had time to introduce themselves to each other. 
However, this lack of personal familiarity does not preclude an effective working 
relationship. 
By applying the swift trust foundations to the above scenario, several reasons 
appear for the formation of swift trust. First, regardless of the fact that the individuals 
may be unfamiliar with each other, they all have clearly defined roles at particular 
incidents. The officer can trust the firefighters more readily because he is not relying on a 
non-existent personal relationship. Rather, he can identify and trust in them based upon 
their firefighting assignment. This position defines the actions the firefighter will take 
depending upon the type of response and a variety of other factors. Both the officer and 
the firefighter are familiar with the roles and duties of each other’s position. The 
uncertainty that may exist due to their personal unfamiliarity is overcome by dealing with 
each other based upon their roles rather than their personalities. 
Additionally, swift trust forms easily as the officer and firefighters are a team at 
each incident. They arrive in the same fire engine or truck, wear the same uniform, and 
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are identified with the same unit number. The failure of any one member of the team 
reflects badly on the unit or team itself. Rather than looking to compete with another 
member of the unit, the members provide assistance to each other to ensure task 
completion and each other’s safety. Furthermore, although they may not know each 
other, some likelihood of future interaction exists. This likelihood benefits swift trust as 
individual firefighters and officers have reputations that could be damaged by poor 
performance or lack of trust.  
Also, the unfamiliar firefighters and officer use the same terminology and 
standard operating procedures at every incident that are standardized throughout the 
department so that despite working in a new area with new people, everyone coordinates 
actions because the procedures and terminology are understood. Finally, despite the lack 
of personal familiarity in the described scenario, all members share the same 
organizational culture. The firefighters and officer, who lack a personal history with each 
other, share a common in-group. This group shapes their identity and brings them closer 
together. 
J. SUMMARY 
This examination of the foundations to swift trust against the backdrop of 
interagency emergency response in NYC reveals several barriers to the creation and 
development of swift trust between the FDNY and NYPD during the early stages of an 
emergency incident. Both procedural and technical barriers exist that often prevent 
communication between agencies prior to one agency beginning tactical operations at an 
incident. Additionally, in contrast to some of the swift trust studies involving non-
emergency settings, the nature of emergency incidents themselves pose a potential barrier 
to communication as units may be engaged in life saving operations with no time to 
communicate. Furthermore, NYPD response protocols do not provide either the 
necessary manpower or appropriate supervisory counterpart to engage in a meeting to 
discern roles and responsibilities at the beginning of the incident. Swift trust formation is 
further hampered by a confusing incident management system that encourages 
competition between agencies with redundant responsibilities. Additionally, that system 
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leaves a negative impression of interagency group work that further inhibits swift trust. 
Also, competition and organizational bias prevent the development of a “one team” 
mindset. Other barriers include differing standard operating procedures, equipment, and 
language.  
Finally, FDNY training does little to enhance swift trust between the FDNY and 
NYPD. Training sessions to familiarize FDNY members with CIMS protocols are not 
conducted with other agencies, and thus, prevent discussion of operational problems. 
Furthermore, interagency drills, while important for familiarization, do little to enhance 
swift trust as they fail to address the barriers described above. Ultimately, attempts at 
establishing personal trust at these training opportunities, while perhaps helpful in the 
long term, will likely not help during the early stages of an incident, as the members who 
trained together and developed a personal trust will most likely not be at the incident 
together. Overcoming these barriers requires the FDNY and NYPD to make major 
changes.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Swift trust formation between the FDNY and NYPD in the initial stages of some 
interagency incidents will be extremely difficult. As stated earlier, most interagency 
incidents are resolved successfully. However, a successful resolution does not mean it 
entailed a collaborative response. While this might not make a difference for many 
smaller incidents, in a large-scale or homeland security incident, it very well could. Given 
the emphasis homeland security leaders place on collaboration and coordination among 
emergency response agencies, it would be useful for the FDNY and NYPD to explore 
other avenues to improve their collaborative capacity. One way is to enhance the 
foundations through which swift trust is formed. The following recommendations are 
made with the understanding that the intent to collaborate must be present between both 
agencies. Some of these recommendations require changes that can only be made at the 
highest levels of NYC government.  
A. REVISE CIMS TO CLARIFY OPERATIONAL ROLES 
All the swift trust studies find that identifying roles and tasks early in the group 
setting enhances swift trust. Unfortunately, CIMS is ambiguous in terms of operational 
roles at certain incidents. While it was enacted as framework for command, it also 
addresses operational roles by establishing core competencies. An agency with a core 
competency in a subject matter is empowered to give tactical direction to members of 
other agencies at incidents involving those competencies. However, CIMS does not 
explain how that is done, and it rarely is. Additionally, FDNY training procedures do not 
currently include giving tactical direction to another agency. Instead, uncertainty exists as 
to which agency will perform which role. Additionally, CIMS has not been revised since 
it began governing emergency response in 2005.193 To comply more fully with federal 
mandates, all interagency incidents should involve shared command, regardless of the 
agency that arrives first. One specific change to CIMS needed is the inclusion of scaffold 
                                                 
193 NYC adopted CIMS on May 14, 2004. Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed Executive Order No. 61 
mandating its implementation on April 11, 2005. 
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emergencies in the command matrix. These kinds of emergencies are fairly common 
incidents that have been the cause of numerous interagency disagreements in recent 
years. 
B. END OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCIES BETWEEN THE FDNY AND 
NYPD 
NYC is fortunate to have extremely large, capable police and fire departments. 
Contrary to some arguments, the current policy of redundancy does not make the system 
more resilient. Training both departments to complete the same tasks is wasteful and 
promotes a competitive culture that ultimately hinders swift trust and collaboration. 
While it may seem that having two agencies with the ability to accomplish the same task 
is a beneficial redundancy, each agency has differing missions, safety standards, 
capabilities, manpower, and equipment. Instead of having multiple agencies capable of 
the same tasks, each agency should train and concentrate on their primary missions and 
understand the capabilities and missions of the other agencies. By gaining an 
understanding of their partners’ capabilities, the responder is more likely to develop swift 
trust with those groups to accomplish the divided and agreed upon tasks.  
C. CREATE A “ONE TEAM” STRATEGY  
As part of the strategy to develop swift trust and improve collaboration, 
emergency responders from all agencies must begin to view themselves as part of a team. 
That team has member agencies with specific missions and diverse skill sets. Those 
missions must be accomplished in the same “physical space and time period.”194 Too 
often the focus of interagency discussions is on who is in charge rather than how can they 
accomplish the mission together. This “one team” strategy will take a task force approach 
to interagency incidents. It will require cross agency training to familiarize members with 
their partner agency’s capabilities as is done with the NY-TF1. Additionally, it requires 
utilization of standard operating procedures and language at interagency incidents. 
Furthermore, police officers and firefighters should be aware of and follow the same 
                                                 
194 Duggan, “The New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team,” 30. 
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safety protocols at interagency incidents. Currently, differing standards lead to 
uncertainty about how an agency will address a particular incident. This uncertainty is 
detrimental to swift trust. 
1. Require Completion of CIMS After Action Review Worksheet  
In addition to CIMS revisions, the FDNY and NYPD should require completion 
of a standard CIMS After Action Review (AAR) worksheet. Currently, FDNY officers 
and chiefs have the option of submitting an AAR worksheet following an interagency 
incident in addition to their standard agency report. (See Appendix). However, typically 
each agency simply completes their standard agency report for each incident. Usually, an 
attempt is made to obtain the name and badge or shield number of a member of another 
agency and that information is included in the report. The author proposes the FDNY and 
NYPD develop a standard CIMS AAR worksheet to be completed by a member of each 
agency for all interagency incidents. It could be the responsibility of the agency 
commanders on scene or the first arriving officers. The report should be brief and include 
basic information about the incident, as well as names of the responders or their 
supervisors if present. The report should then ask for a description of any operational or 
interagency difficulties. Too often complaints about interagency problems are anecdotal. 
Someone heard this agency acted a certain way or that agency failed to do something. 
This report will begin to document operational problems. It will also be used during a 
dispute resolution phase described later in these recommendations. The report itself also 
serves as a potential incentive to operate collaboratively and exchange information as 
responders will be aware that their names, statements, and actions will be part of an 
official record. Included in the interagency report should be official times each agency 
was notified of the incident to address speculation that the FDNY receives delayed 
notification to some interagency incidents.195  
                                                 
195 Esposito, “New York City Fire Department Chief Officer’s Evaluation,” 56. Esposito’s survey 
found 85% of fire chiefs surveyed believed they received delayed notification to an incident. 
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2. Enhance Interagency Drills 
The FDNY has gone to great lengths to increase the number of interagency drills 
and improve the quality as well. However, even with increased drills, logistically, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to give everyone these training opportunities. Even those who 
participate, generally get a “one shot” experience.196 Also, although they involve 
multiple agencies, little interaction occurs between operational members of different 
agencies who will be the first to arrive at a real incident. These drills should be more 
realistic and allow first responding units of the NYPD and FDNY opportunities to 
develop and utilize swift trust. 
Furthermore, each week FDNY units conduct a multi-unit drill that involves 
several fire companies from a particular area. Unlike the above mentioned interagency 
and tabletop exercises, all firefighters and officers participate in these multi-unit drills. 
The author proposes the FDNY request the NYPD send an ESU unit to participate in 
these drills once a month. These drills will focus on interagency type responses to 
familiarize members with the other agency’s procedures, as well as help to form the 
beginnings of personal relationships that could foster traditional trust. Unlike the large 
interagency drills, in which members participate from all over NYC, these multi-unit 
drills are area specific. These drills occur regularly and present a more likely probability 
that FDNY and NYPD members that drilled together may actually respond to a real 
emergency together. Working, planning, or drilling together repetitively “plays a critical 
part in building trust.”197 
Additionally, CIMS and ICS training should be conducted with integrated NYPD 
and FDNY members, which represents an opportunity to engage different groups in a 
collaborative learning environment to “learn together.” When conducted with personnel 
solely from one’s agency, discussions are unproductive and sometimes turn into a 
complaint session about incidents with interagency friction. These complaints go 
                                                 
196 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We 
Repeat Them, and How Can We Learn From Them,” 16. 
197 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special Event 
Security,” Homeland Security Affairs 3, no. 3 (September 2007): 13, http://www.hsaj.org/?article=3.3.1. 
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unaddressed as the only members in the room are of the same agency. These discussions 
would be more productive if FDNY and NYPD personnel gave their perspectives to each 
other. 
3. Formulate Realistic Dispute Resolution Avenues 
The current system of AAR is ineffective and should be overhauled. Many in the 
FDNY are so disillusioned by the process they choose not even to file an AAR worksheet 
in the first place. Currently, a formal After Action Review may be conducted if requested 
by an agency or recommended by OEM.198 The lack of AAR requests could give the 
impression that problems do not exist. When CIMS protocols are violated, an open and 
honest format should exist for resolving and repairing any damage to the FDNY and 
NYPD relationship. The FDNY and NYPD should agree to create an advisory panel to 
review the required AAR worksheets mentioned above for interagency incidents. The 
panel should include representatives of the FDNY, NYPD, and OEM. The above 
referenced AAR worksheets should be the basis for panel reviews of individual incidents 
when operational problems occur.  
4. Establish an FDNY-NYPD Interagency Collaboration Medal 
Every year the FDNY honors members who have performed particular acts of 
bravery or skill in going above and beyond the call of duty. The FDNY Medal Day is a 
joyous occasion as members of the department recognize and celebrate their fellow 
firefighters. The mayor, Fire Commissioner, and FDNY Chief of Department bestow the 
medals. The author proposes the FDNY add a new medal to those bestowed at medal day 
for the fire company or individual that operated collaboratively with the NYPD in a 
successful rescue of a civilian. Sometimes these rescues are honored; however, the 
collaborative aspect is not acknowledged. This medal should stress the collaborative 
aspect of the rescue. Additionally, the NYPD member involved, his family, and 
coworkers should be invited to receive the medal at FDNY Medal Day alongside the 
                                                 
198 New York City Office of Emergency Management, Citywide Incident Management System, April 
6, 2005, 49. 
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FDNY member with whom he collaborated. Similarly, the NYPD could provide joint 
recognition for their members and FDNY members who engage in this type of 
collaborative rescue. This recognition will demonstrate the importance with which FDNY 
and NYPD leadership view interagency collaboration.  
5. Leadership Commitment 
As in all relationships, what organizations do has far greater impact than what 
they say.199 Leaders influence what organizations do. These proposals to enhance swift 
trust and improve collaboration call for major changes to the way the FDNY and NYPD 
operate, as well as the way they view each other and themselves. These proposals require 
changes to interagency protocols and training procedures. They will not be easy or 
without cost.  
Emergency response agencies do not operate in a vacuum at interagency 
incidents. Everyone is dependent on each other to share information, divide 
responsibilities, and accomplish individual tasks in support of the overall mission. 
Continuing to adjust systems and protocols for specific past failures has proven an 
insufficient long-term strategy. Interagency responses call for a new strategy that requires 
“leaders to drastically alter their perception of organizationally isolated response 
models.”200 
The FDNY and NYPD promise the people of NYC collaboration and 
coordination and they owe them that. They also owe firefighters, police officers, and their 
first line supervisors the best chance at working collaboratively with each other right 
from the start. Those commitments can begin to be fulfilled by building the foundation of 
swift trust.  
                                                 
199 Covey, The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything, 128. 
200 Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police Units 
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